I love endurance sports, and I work out incessantly. But I don’t watch sports or know much about them. Before hanging out with a group other men, I ask my wife to give me a summary of which local sports teams have recently won a match so I don’t embarrass myself. Results have been mixed. So forgive me if my football analogies are a little off here.
In football, wide receivers have little control over whether they’ll be thrown the ball on any given play. Though they might end up making a big play once the ball is thrown to them, they’re powerless without it in their hands. Even plays that are designed to get them the ball might be impacted by the defense, leaving them high and dry.
Unlike a wide receiver, a court-appointed receiver can exert control over the situation. A receiver is a court-appointed neutral steward of a business. They have independent authority to manage operations, make business decisions, and preserve (or strategically wind down) the business’s assets while litigation grinds forward. In some situations, they’re given limited marching orders from a court, and they must take action that’s within the confines of those orders.
But at other times, they have broad authority to call the shots, including whether to buy or sell company assets, and how to wind down a business.
A recent Pennsylvania Superior Court decision, Toth v. Toth, 324 A.3d 469, offers a detailed look at just how broad authority a receiver can have to protect the assets of a closely held business when feuding co-owners threaten to destroy it from the inside out.
Toth v. Toth: When a family business leads to a family war
Toth concerned a battle over Learning Sciences International, LLC (“LSI”), a company founded by Michael Toth in 2002. The company provides solutions for professional development and performance management in education. Over the years, Michael gave ownership interests in LSI to his brother Bryan, his father Eugene, and his mother Marie. Michael and Bryan each held 50% in voting rights and 25% in ownership rights, while Eugene and Marie held only 25% in ownership rights.
In late 2020, their relationships deteriorated dramatically. By January 2021, Bryan, Eugene, and Marie executed a series of documents that they believed amended LSI’s operating agreement to change the company’s headquarters to Florida, remove Michael as CEO, and strip him of his management role. They based this attempted coup on a technical reading of the voting provisions in the original operating agreement.
There was just one problem. They were wrong.Continue Reading THIS AIN’T FOOTBALL: PA. SUPERIOR COURT LETS A RECEIVER CALL THE PLAYS










